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DO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS FACILITATE POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM; CAN THEY? 
Nicole Mansker∗ & Neal Devins** 
 
Four months ago, Iowa voters tossed out three justices who backed same-
sex marriage.  Academic and media commentary of the elections largely 
focused on the related questions of whether judicial elections fundamentally 
threaten judicial independence and whether constitutional change can be 
pursued through something less draconian than the ouster of judges.  The 
possibility that judicial elections should be embraced as a vehicle to facilitate 
constitutional dialogues between voters, elected officials, and judges got no 
meaningful play in discussions of the Iowa elections.  Likewise, there was next 
to no discussion of whether judicial elections facilitate “popular 
constitutionalism”—by making fundamental constitutional questions more 
tangible, more immediate.1 
The Iowa elections certainly call attention to the need to think about the 
mechanisms by which voters can constructively engage in popular 
constitutionalism.  Likewise, the advent of the Tea Party (which regularly 
invoked the Federal Constitution in its call to rein in governmental power) 
highlights the potential power of social movements in shaping constitutional 
discourse and, in so doing, highlights the need to—as Larry Kramer put it—
consider “what kind of institutions we can construct to make popular 
constitutionalism work.”2  For this and many other reasons, David Pozen’s 
“Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism”3 is timely and important.  
Recognizing that a major problem impeding the implementation of popular 
constitutionalism is the lack of an institutional structure that can foster popular 
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  1. Popular constitutionalism is the idea that society must move away from the juricentric 
constitutional culture and allow for the people themselves to assert their authority over the 
identification and enforcement of constitutional norms.  Correspondingly, popular 
constitutionalism rejects judicial supremacy as breeding citizen passivity, elite rule, constitutional 
alienation, and judicial overreaching.  For an introduction to popular constitutionalism, see 
generally Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves:  Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial 
Review (2004). 
2. Larry Kramer, Response, 81 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1173, 1182 (2006). 
3. David E. Pozen, Judicial Elections as Popular Constitutionalism, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 
2047 (2010). 
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constitutionalism in a coherent and beneficial way, Pozen posits that popular 
constitutionalism has a strong ally in the institution of state judicial elections.  
In so doing, Pozen seeks a paradigm shift in popular constitutionalism—
recognizing that popular constitutionalism cannot be moored to nationwide 
conversations about the Federal Constitution but, instead, must take into 
account the profound role that state courts and state constitutions play in 
shaping our national constitutional discourse.  Equally significant, Pozen 
recognizes that popular constitutionalist discourse must shift focus away from 
the theoretical question of whether popular constitutionalism is legitimate to 
the methodological question of institutional design. 
Calling judicial elections a “systematic and pervasive mechanism for 
popular constitutionalism,” Pozen argues that state judicial elections are a 
“focal point with which to stimulate and structure constitutional deliberation.”4  
His article conceives of judicial elections as vehicles for popular 
constitutionalism.  The basis for this thought experiment is understandable—
elections create a dialogue between the people and the courts, make courts and 
the work of the courts more salient and comprehensible, facilitate discourse, 
and provide judges with a means to determine the popular will.  Moreover, 
state courts play a major role in interpreting and enforcing the Federal 
Constitution, and, perhaps more importantly, state courts are often at the 
cutting edge of recognizing rights that will eventually spill over into the 
national constitutional discourse.  Finally, state judges interested in retaining 
their seats will take popular opinion into account when deciding cases, and if 
they do not, elections will force out judges insensitive to the people—
presumably to be replaced by judges whose views will be shaped by popular 
constitutional discourse. 
In a recent article, published as part of a University of Pennsylvania 
Journal of Constitutional Law symposium on the judiciary and the popular 
will, we discussed just that:  the role of public opinion in state supreme court 
decisionmaking.5  Though constitutional scholars have discussed for years 
whether public opinion has any influence on the United States Supreme Court, 
few scholars have focused their attention on state supreme courts.  Like Pozen, 
we sought to move the discussion of the influence of popular opinion on 
judicial decisionmaking to the state level.  We note that the gap in the literature 
with respect to state courts is particularly unfortunate given the role state 
supreme courts play in our constitutional system.6  Looking to the unique 
features of state supreme courts, we posit that state supreme court 
responsiveness to the will of the people is linked to the direct democracy 
features of the state, including most importantly the selection and retention 
methods of state supreme court justices.  Our research is thus a useful starting 
point in which to consider the workability of state judicial elections as vehicles 
 
4. Id. at 2050. 
5. Neal Devins & Nicole Mansker, Public Opinion and State Supreme Courts, 13 U. Pa. J. 
Const. L. 455 (2010). 
6. See Neal Devins, How State Supreme Courts Take Consequences into Account, 62 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1629, 1630–39 (2010) (“Over the past thirty years, state courts have eclipsed the U.S. 
Supreme Court in shaping the meaning of constitutional values, both in their home states and 
throughout the nation.”). 
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of popular constitutionalism.  We identify different limits than those articulated 
by Pozen for using judicial elections in this regard. 
First, a bit about our research.7  Our research indicates that most state 
supreme court justices have the incentive and capacity to take into account 
potential voter backlash.  This is a result of the unique features of state courts 
that make them more democratically accountable than their federal 
counterparts.  Simply put, state judicial systems are subject to far more checks 
than the federal judiciary.  With the exception of but a few states, state 
supreme court justices do not serve life terms, the level of docket control that a 
state supreme court possesses varies widely from virtually total control to no 
control, and eleven states, either by constitution or statute, authorize or require 
the state supreme court to give advisory opinions.  Initiatives and referendums 
are in wide use in many states, and eighteen states allow citizens to use the 
initiative process to amend the state constitution.  The constitutions themselves 
are a point of distinction.  The amendability of some state constitutions makes 
them more like super statutes than like solemn documents of irreducible rights, 
whereas other state constitutions are of comparable difficulty to amend as the 
Federal Constitution.  Of course, the most significant distinction between state 
and federal courts is judicial elections.  Thirty-nine states subject their state 
supreme court justices to some form of elections, either retention, partisan or 
nonpartisan. 
After reviewing the distinctly democratic features of state supreme courts, 
we turned to existing empirical evidence to determine if there was a connection 
between state supreme court decisionmaking and public opinion.  In states with 
contested elections, state justices, like other politicians, “have a tendency to 
vote in accordance with perceived constituency preferences on visible issues, 
simply because the failure to do so is politically dangerous.”8  Crime and death 
penalty issues force justices subject to all election types to consider public 
opinion.  However, studies find that state supreme court justices are influenced 
by their retention constituencies, especially when an election is near.9 
Based on the existing research, we set out to expand the discussion of the 
influence of public opinion on state supreme courts.  We gathered data on a 
variety of high salience issues, including abortion, same-sex marriage, school 
finance, gun control, and crime to determine if there was a link between public 
opinion and state supreme court decisions.  For our analysis, we divided states 
into four groups:  (1) partisan election states, (2) nonpartisan election states, 
(3) merit plan states, and (4) gubernatorial or legislative appointment states.  
We found that justices facing partisan elections are more likely to consider 
public opinion in their decisionmaking.  Regardless of retention election 
method, state supreme court justices generally align with public opinion on 
 
7. In addition to the research in our recent article published in the University of 
Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, the following discussion is also drawn from Devins, 
supra note 6.   
8. Melinda Gann Hall, Justices as Representatives:  Elections and Judicial Politics in the 
American States, 29 Am. Pol. Q. 485, 489–90 (1995). 
9. Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 482.  Appointed judges responded more often to the 
will of the legislature and governor than to the will of the people, and judges in their last term 
before retirement responded less to any sort of political will.  Id. 
30 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW SIDEBAR [Vol. 111:27 
high salience issues.  However, the retention election method is relevant to the 
frequency with which state supreme courts decide cases contrary to the popular 
will.  Courts in partisan and nonpartisan election states appear less inclined to 
hear high salience issues to begin with and less inclined to rule against public 
opinion when retained through partisan or nonpartisan elections.  At the same 
time, we recognized that there are few issues of such high salience such that 
the public will be cognizant of the decisions of state supreme court justices.  
With respect to the low salience issues, the courts have incentive to turn to 
business interests and campaign donors, especially given the infusion of money 
into judicial campaigns in recent years.  Empirical evidence and anecdotal 
evidence indicate that justices are sensitive to the business interests that fund 
their campaigns (in partisan and nonpartisan election states).  Indeed, judges 
themselves recognize that money can influence a judge’s decisions both 
consciously and unconsciously.10 
In the end, our analysis indicates that state supreme courts are influenced 
by public opinion, at least with respect to high salience issues, and especially if 
the court is subject to partisan or nonpartisan elections.  This is not necessarily 
the equivalent, however, of positing that judicial elections can facilitate 
popular constitutionalism. 
I. POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM?  WELL, WHAT ABOUT THOSE 
CONSTITUTIONS? 
In considering popular constitutionalism, it is important to first look to the 
constitution itself.  State constitutions are much more malleable than the 
Federal Constitution.11  The states have adopted in total more than 147 
different constitutions.  Thirty states have had three or more constitutions in 
their histories, and Louisiana has had eleven constitutions.  State constitutions 
are regularly amended (Alabama over 800 times), and the procedures for 
amending are often far more lax than the procedures for amending the Federal 
Constitution.  Furthermore, in eighteen states, citizens can play a direct role in 
shaping the constitution through the initiative process.  The result has been, in 
some states, constitutions that are more like super statutes that elevate what 
most would consider to be ordinary law to the status of constitutional law; state 
constitutions look like super legislation, “not sacred texts.”12  As Pozen 
himself points out, “[s]tate constitutions never attained any mythical status.”13 
The amendability of state constitutions is important to a discussion of 
popular constitutionalism and state judicial elections.  First, it suggests that—
irrespective of judicial elections—citizens are already directly involved in 
shaping constitutional culture through constitutional amendment initiatives and 
state legislatures are or can be involved in changing the constitutional text to 
reflect voter preferences.  Second, the amendabilty of state constitutions calls 
 
10. Brief Amici Curiae of 27 Former Chief Justices and Justices in Support of Petitioners at 
5, Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S. Ct. 2252 (2009) (No. 08-22). 
11. See Devins, supra note 6, at 1639–44 (examining state constitutions). 
12. Lawrence Friedman, State Constitutions in Historical Perspective, 496 Annals Am. 
Acad. Pol. & Soc. Sci. 33, 35 (1988). 
13. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2088. 
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into question the idea that state constitutions are a separate, higher, more 
fundamental law than is ordinary law.  Correspondingly, provisions in several 
state constitutions suggest that these constitutions are anything but 
fundamental law.  Examples abound, including an article of the Arkansas 
constitution devoted to railroads, canals, and turnpikes; a provision of the New 
York constitution specifying the width of ski trails in the Adirondak Park; and 
a provision of the Texas constitution governing the use of unmanned teller 
machines at banks. 
In certain respects, popular constitutionalism at the state level becomes 
just a call for citizen lawmaking, a more democratic society, rather than a call 
for citizens to actively engage in the creation and enforcement of the type of 
constitutional norms that animate popular constitutionalism theory.  Perhaps 
more fundamentally, citizens (or their representatives) are well positioned to 
nullify state judicial decisionmaking.14  Any interpretation disliked by the 
people can be remedied through amendments either directly in states with 
constitutional initiatives or indirectly through the people’s representatives.  
None of this is to say that state constitutions cannot operate as fundamental 
law—It is often the case that they do, and it is often the case that state court 
interpretations of state constitutions transform the national constitutional 
landscape.  As noted earlier, state courts sometimes play a critical leadership 
role in shaping our most fundamental constitutional values.  With that said, the 
different natures of state and federal constitutions must be acknowledged in 
any state-focused theory of popular constitutionalism. 
II. STATE JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 
In thirty-nine states, state supreme court justices are subject to some form 
of election.15   Before the mid-1980s, there was little reason to think that state 
judicial elections held much promise for popular constitutionalism.  At that 
time, elections were seen as “low key affairs[,] [c]onducted with civility and 
dignity, which were as exciting as a game of checkers . . . [p]layed by mail.”16  
Over the past twenty-five years (and especially in the past several years), “[t]he 
confluence of broadened freedom for [judicial candidates] to speak out on 
issues, the increasing importance of state judicial politics, and the infusion of 
money into judicial campaigns have produced what may be described as the 
‘Perfect Storm’ of judicial elections.”17 
Today, as David Pozen explained in a 2008 Columbia Law Review 
article,18 state supreme court elections often look similar to the typical partisan 
election in the legislative and executive branches.  Money is playing an ever 
 
14. Pozen recognizes this; among other things, his article calls attention to various 
mechanisms by which voters and lawmakers can amend state constitutions—including direct 
democracy responses to unpopular court rulings.  Pozen, supra note 3, at 2088–93. 
15. Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 460. 
16. Joanna M. Shepherd, Are Appointed Judges Strategic Too?, 58 Duke L. J. 1589, 1602 
(2009). 
17. James L. Gibson, Challenges to the Impartiality of State Supreme Courts:  Legitimacy 
Theory and ‘New-Style’ Judicial Campaigns, 102 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 59, 60 (2008). 
18. David E. Pozen, The Irony of Judicial Elections, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 265 (2008). 
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expanding role in judicial elections—from 2000–2009 more than two and one-
half times the amount of money was raised for state supreme court elections 
than from 1990–1999.19  Unsurprisingly, expenditures are almost entirely in 
the fourteen states with partisan and nonpartisan elections.  The combination of 
fewer restraints on judicial candidate speech and the infusion of money into 
judicial campaigns has resulted in more competitive and contested elections 
with higher loss rates for judges subject to partisan and nonpartisan elections.  
As the amount spent on judicial elections has spiked, so has the tenor of 
negative advertising in such elections.20  The role of business interests in 
shaping judicial elections has also spiked, with probusiness interest groups 
now accounting for 44% of fundraising and 90% of special interest television 
and advertising.21 
This transformation in state judicial elections cuts both ways for popular 
constitutionalists.  On the one hand, there is reason to think that state supreme 
courts have the capacity and incentive to take popular opinion into account—
clearly something that cuts in favor of judicial elections and popular 
constitutionalism.  On the other hand, the prospect of meaningful popular 
constitutionalist discourse is severely limited both by the tendency for voters to 
consider only a handful of high salience issues and by the pervasive influence 
of business and out-of-state interests.  Unlike Pozen (who thinks that concerns 
of issue salience and structural issues tied to how judges are elected can be 
ameliorated),22 we think that the ability of special interests to capitalize on 
voter uninterest in low salience issues severely limits the use of state judicial 
elections as a mechanism to facilitate popular constitutionalism.23 
A.  Judicial Candidate Characteristics and Capacity To Discern Public 
Opinion 
State supreme court justices are well positioned to discern public opinion 
and the likelihood of backlash to their decisions.24  In comparison to their 
federal counterparts, particularly Justices on the United States Supreme Court, 
state justices are far more versed in state politics and are more connected to 
voters, political parties, campaign contributors, and interest groups.  State 
justices are generally well informed regarding the in-state political climate by 
virtue of their membership in the state and their professional and social 
interactions.  For example, as of 2000, 65.7% of justices were born in the state 
 
19. Devins & Mansker, supra note 5, at 465–67. 
20. Devins, supra note 6, at 1662. 
21. See James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2006, at 7, 18 (2006), 
available at http://brennan.3cdn.net/49c18b6cb18960b2f9_z6m62gwji.pdf (on file with the 
Columbia Law Review). 
22. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2099 (concluding concerns about efficacy of judicial elections 
are not necessarily responsive to use of judicial elections as a means to advance popular 
constitutionalism). 
23. This is not to say that contested state judicial elections undermine the legitimacy of state 
supreme courts.  Voters may see elections as legitimating mechanisms—even if they are only 
personally interested in a handful of high salience issues.  Thanks to Jim Gibson for discussing 
with us his ongoing research on the ways in which judicial elections might legitimate state 
supreme court decisionmaking. 
24. This subsection is drawn from Devins, supra note 6, at 1668–71. 
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in which they serve, and 60.5% received law degrees from schools in the state.  
Also, 33.1% of justices served as prosecutors at some point in their career, and 
15% formerly served as elected officials.  Finally, states themselves are much 
smaller units in which to discern public opinion and voter backlash risks. 
Particularly relevant to whether contested judicial elections can facilitate 
popular constitutionalism is that justices facing contested elections are of a 
different type or quality than appointed justices and are, thus, more likely to 
understand the political ramifications of their decisions.25  Judges subject to 
contested elections look and act more like politicians.  They attend lower-
ranked law schools and are more politically connected and overall less well 
educated than appointed judges.  Social psychology tells us that it is a basic 
human desire to be liked; thus, it is no surprise that judicial candidates facing 
the electorate have a strong interest in the esteem of the public.26  It seems 
clear, then, that state supreme court justices facing contested elections are more 
attuned to the popular will—a plus factor for the popular constitutionalist—but 
at the same time, it must be recognized that there are few issues that will 
trigger the public’s attention. 
B.  Issue Saliency 
High salience issues such as abortion, the death penalty, and crime are 
often the subjects of judicial campaigns.  Indeed, past judicial elections have 
taught that justices can be ousted due to their vote in a single case on one of 
these topics, often a vote portrayed incorrectly or deceptively by the opposition 
campaign or interest group.  State supreme court justices clearly recognize 
these high salience, high stakes issues.  Former California Supreme Court 
Justice Otto Kaus has remarked that “[t]here’s no way a judge is going to be 
able to ignore the political consequences of certain decisions, especially if he 
or she has to make them near election time.  That would be like ignoring a 
crocodile in your bathtub.”27  There are also reports of Georgia and Louisiana 
justices changing their votes in response to perceived voter sanctions.28  At 
first blush, this type of judicial response may seem promising for the prospects 
of judicial elections as tools for popular constitutionalism.  Justices are taking 
into account public opinion and the consequences of ignoring it with respect to 
these high salience issues. 
However, the story is a bit more complicated.  Not only did those Georgia 
and Louisiana justices change their votes, they also admitted to overlooking 
 
25. Pozen recognizes this when he notes that one of the challenges to judicial elections as 
vehicles of popular constitutionalism is that elections breed lower quality candidates or money-
focused candidates who play favorites with donors, interest groups, political parties, and popular 
litigants.  Pozen, supra note 3, at 2099. 
26. See Lawrence Baum, Judges and Their Audiences:  A Perspective on Judicial Behavior 
62 (2006) (“[T]he public vote still exists as a well-publicized evaluation, and it can be important 
to judges’ self-esteem that they secure as positive an evaluation as possible even if they do not 
fear defeat.”). 
27. Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, 73 A.B.A. J. 52, 58 (1987).  It is interesting to 
note that California Supreme Court justices are subject to retention elections, not contested 
partisan or nonpartisan elections.  The pressure of elections, to some degree it seems, is universal. 
28. Devins, supra note 6, at 1664. 
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errors in criminal cases, instead passing them on to the federal courts, secured 
with their lifetime appointments, to make the difficult decisions.29  Instead of 
correcting legal errors (often unrelated to constitutional questions), the justices 
passed on the issues to avoid voter sanction.  This indicates that on high 
salience issues, justices avoid controversy in the name of judicial preservation 
and, in so doing, simply maintain the status quo.  Indeed, our research supports 
this conclusion.  We found state supreme court justices subject to contested 
elections decided fewer high salience issues than those justices subject to 
retention elections or appointment schemes.  Pozen notes the problem himself, 
recognizing that backlash to judicial decisions can facilitate popular 
constitutionalism; it can “sharpen constitutional questions, catalyze political 
engagement, and ultimately invigorate the popular responsiveness of 
constitutional law.”30  If judges are simply avoiding the high salience issues, as 
research indicates, in order to avoid electoral defeat, instead of facilitating 
popular constitutionalism, judicial elections may neuter the courts as 
arbitrators and reduce judicial creativity and courage. 
Another concern for popular constitutionalism tied to issue saliency is the 
nature of the issues that are salient.  For the most part, contested judicial 
elections do not turn on constitutional questions.  Questions of judicial 
character, tort law, and criminal law typically play larger roles in judicial 
elections than do questions of constitutional law.  Moreover, even when 
constitutional issues are at the forefront of a judicial race (Iowa, for example), 
voters typically focus their energies on a single issue—rather than participate 
in a broader conversation about the meaning of far-ranging constitutional 
values. 
Against this backdrop, it is hardly surprising that politically insulated state 
supreme courts play a path-breaking role, forging new constitutional 
understandings.31  On same-sex marriage, no state with partisan or nonpartisan 
elections has expanded the rights of same-sex couples.  Of the seven states that 
constitutionalized same-sex marriage or civil union, five were from the eleven 
states that do not make use of judicial elections.  Courts subject to elections are 
seriously hampered in their ability to lead the way in forward thinking and 
move the direction of future public opinion.  Elected judges are thus unlikely 
to attempt to forge new constitutional understanding, thereby “contribut[ing] 
nothing distinctive to the ‘discursive formation of popular will upon which 
democracy is based.’”32 
C.  Information and the Public’s Capacity To Engage in Popular 
Constitutionalism Through Judicial Elections 
The question of voter capacity to constructively engage in popular 
 
29. Id. at 1664. 
30. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2128–29. 
31. For a discussion of the characteristics of path-breaking states, see Devins, supra note 6, 
at 1675–85. 
32. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2131 (quoting Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Popular 
Constitutionalism, Departmentalism, and Judicial Supremacy, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1027, 1036 
(2004)). 
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constitutional discourse through judicial elections is, of course, central to 
Pozen’s project and our critique of it.  In our view, there are significant 
concerns about popular election of judges, prime among them being whether 
citizens can select judges and interpret and enforce the constitution in a 
reasoned and responsible way.  Do people have the capacity to achieve the 
goals of popular constitutionalism given a society apathetic and ignorant in the 
voting booth?  Research shows that the majority of Americans lack basic 
political comprehension and nearly one third are “political ‘know nothings’ 
who possess little or no useful knowledge of politics.”33  Pozen finds such 
criticisms “inconclusive,” reporting that research shows that judicial elections 
can meet minimal criteria of efficacy (despite the fact that judicial elections 
lack public dialogue on constitutional interpretation or judicial duty).  Pozen 
insists that “elections generate more regular and robust information about the 
content of public opinion.”34  Thus, they act as signaling functions as to 
popular opinion. 
Although it is true that competitive elections promote greater public 
involvement and provide information about public opinion to judicial 
candidates, the information that judicial elections create (both about judicial 
candidates for the public and about public opinion for judicial candidates) is 
often of limited use to advancing popular constitutionalism.  Advertising in 
judicial elections has become more negative, and interest groups are funding 
advertising focusing only on hot-button issues such as crime and the death 
penalty, or the personal characteristics of the candidates.35  Those hot-button 
issues are likely to rile the public.  But the public is rarely signaling anything 
to the court that the court does not already know with respect to those topics.  
People generally think criminals should face long sentences, and often the 
state’s public opinion on the death penalty is well known.  Yet the portrayal of 
decisions of justices is often misleading, focusing on one case and distorting 
facts of that one case. 
At the same time, as our research shows, judges in contested elections 
typically rule in ways that match public opinion—suggesting that judicial 
elections do hold promise to check state justices on hot-button constitutional 
questions.  The problem, however, is that there are very few constitutionally 
salient issues and judicial elections rarely invoke any discussion of the 
constitution.  More than that, business interests will often run negative ads 
concerning crime and judicial character—in an effort to manipulate public 
opinion and secure the election of probusiness justices.  Correspondingly, on 
constitutionally salient issues like same-sex marriage, out-of-state interest 
groups often play a defining role in financing negative advertising and 
 
33. Ilya Somin, Political Ignorance and the Countermajoritarian Difficulty:  A New 
Perspective on the Central Obsession of Constitutional Theory, 89 Iowa L. Rev. 1287, 1304–05 
(2004); see also Pozen, supra note 3, at 2093. 
34. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2120. 
35. Probusiness interests fund much of judicial campaigns and especially advertising, yet 
the focus of the advertising they pay for has nothing to do with business interests.  Advertising 
focuses almost entirely on irrelevant or distorted personal characteristics and high salience issues 
such as crime. 
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otherwise seek to shape judicial elections.36 
In highlighting the role of business interests and out-of-state interest 
groups, we are not claiming that in-state voters never engage in some type of 
constitutional dialogue with state justices through judicial elections.  They do.  
The question is at what price and whether, ultimately, the benefits of judicial 
elections outweigh their costs.  In our view, judicial elections as they exist 
today do not appear to be great tools for the advancement of popular 
constitutionalism.  Judges take into account public opinion in decisionmaking, 
but the advancement of constitutional dialogue is not part of that intercourse.  
Instead, judges subject to election avoid controversial decisions and seek to 
maintain the status quo.  Judicial elections are increasingly politicized, costly, 
and competitive.  Furthermore, the issues which trigger any public opinion at 
all are rarely of a constitutional nature.  It seems clear that what competitive 
judicial elections do is politicize the court and focus on single issues and 
irrelevant personal characteristics that a popular constitutionalist would not 
find valuable. 
Some of the shortcomings in the ability of judicial elections to serve as a 
mechanism to facilitate popular constitutionalism can be dealt with through 
reforms to existing state systems.  To his great credit, Pozen both (1) 
acknowledges the problems associated with judicial elections and how they 
might impact the advancement of popular constitutionalism, and (2) suggests 
that judicial elections can be reformed to mitigate only some of these problems 
and, as such, are “defective vehicles” to facilitate popular constitutionalism.  
At the same time (and also to his credit), Pozen advances a series of reforms 
intended to improve judicial elections in ways that advance the goals of 
popular constitutionalism.  Concerns about voter competence and participation 
in judicial elections are really issues of institutional design, Pozen argues.  He 
states that “[i]t is at least conceivable that an elective system could be 
engineered to provide sufficiently robust competition, accountability, and 
debate to excite popular constitutionalists, while also providing sufficiently 
robust protections for judicial independence and public confidence.”37  To 
arouse voter interest in judicial elections, states might try reforms such as 
permitting political party affiliation by judicial candidates, liberalizing codes 
of conduct to allow judicial candidates to make pledges on how they will 
approach certain kinds of cases, disseminating voter information guides on 
judicial candidates, and holding public events, assemblies, or debates.  Pozen 
argues that, “[i]f campaigns for the bench could be engineered to generate 
robust information about the candidates and their views, it would become 
increasingly untenable to insist that voters nonetheless lack the ability to make 
rational decisions.”38  States can also enhance recusal rules or apply stricter 
contribution limits, or increase term lengths to address problems with the 
 
36. In Iowa, for example, out-of-state interest groups contributed more than in-state groups 
in seeking to oust justices who ruled in favor of same-sex marriage.  Press Release, Brennan Ctr. 
for Justice, 2010 Judicial Elections Increase Pressure on Courts, Reform Groups Say (Nov. 3, 
2010), available at http://www.brennancenter.org/page/-/Democracy/release-november%202010-
110310-final.pdf (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
37. Pozen, supra note 3, at 2103. 
38. Id. at 2098. 
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influence of donors and interest groups.  Nonetheless, recognizing numerous 
limits in the ability of judicial elections to facilitate popular constitutionalism, 
Pozen concludes that the ability of reforms to create robust elective systems 
that facilitate popular constitutionalism is “exceedingly unlikely.”39 
Pozen deserves a lot of credit for thinking about mechanisms that will 
facilitate popular constitutionalism through judicial elections.  With that said, 
like Pozen, we are skeptical that such proposals, in fact, will work.  Elected 
judiciaries already take into account the will of the people, but not in a manner 
conducive to popular constitutionalism.  The root problem, we think, is voter 
interest in either the state or federal constitutions.  For reform proposals to 
work, they must address the lack of constitutional dialogue in judicial 
elections.  In reality, high salience issues, rarely of constitutional tenor, are the 
subjects of judicial elections.  Elections themselves work to politicize the 
courts.  Recusal rules and stricter contribution limits will not stem that tide; 
they will not change the single issue or irrelevant personal characteristic focus 
of advertising. 
That said, perhaps other state features outside of judicial elections are 
better suited to advance the popular constitutionalists goals, such as 
constitutional initiatives and referenda and easy to amend constitutions.  
Constitutional amendment is the principal mechanism by which states now 
update their constitutions.  With constitutional initiatives voters write and 
approve the contents of their constitutions and are directly involved in forming 
and shaping their state’s constitutional culture.  These features do not politicize 
the courts.  They do not subject all judicial decisions to voter approval.  At the 
same time, they act as checks on court interpretations of the constitution, and 
they signal directly to the justices the popular will.  Finally, they provide not 
only a tool for the public to express displeasure with court constitutional 
decisions, but also a means to overrule such decisions.  Given our research on 
the role of public opinion in state supreme court decisionmaking, we find that, 
although state supreme courts take into account popular opinion on certain 
issues, the realities of competitive judicial elections make them unsatisfactory 
tools to truly facilitate popular constitutionalism’s goals. 
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